Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sun, 27 Oct 2002 10:45:48 -0800 | From | jw schultz <> | Subject | Re: warped security |
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On Sun, Oct 27, 2002 at 03:24:28AM -0500, Albert D. Cahalan wrote: > > As a non-root user: > > a. I can't do readlink() on /proc/1/exe ("ls -l /proc/1/exe") > b. I can do "cat /proc/1/maps" to see what files are mapped > > That's backwards. If a user can read /proc/1/cmdline, then > they might as well be permitted to readlink() on /proc/1/exe > as well. Reading /proc/1/maps is quite another matter, > exposing more info than the (prohibited) /proc/1/fd/* does.
It seems to have been this way since at least 2.2. It isn't exclusive to the /proc/*/exe. It applies to all symlinks in /proc/$pid.
As near as i can tell it seems to be a functional-equivalency carryover from 2.2. It isn't causing much harm but i do wonder if this is intentional and if so, why. I'm at a loss to see why refusing to allow non-owners to identify a process's cwd, exe, and root would be desireable. The only other things we refuse are mem, fd/ and eviron, the reasons for which are obvious and the restrictions are per-file rather than as a class.
-- ________________________________________________________________ J.W. Schultz Pegasystems Technologies email address: jw@pegasys.ws
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