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    SubjectRe: rm-ing files with open file descriptors
    Date (Kai Henningsen) writes:
    > (Alexander Viro) wrote:
    >> On Sat, 19 Jan 2002, Miquel van Smoorenburg wrote:

    >>> I now have a flink-test2.txt file. That is pretty cool ;)
    >> It's also a security hole.
    > It may well be one when going via /proc. But is it one when going
    > via a (hypothetical) proper flink(2)? If so, why?
    > Note that every process who has a filehandle open for reading can
    > already get at the file contents and write them to a completely new
    > file, and every process who has it open for writing can already
    > change its contents to everything it likes. So I can see read|write
    > checks on the file handle. Also all the usual link(2) checks. What
    > else could be a hole?

    If the file descriptor you have was opened O_RDONLY, but you have
    write permission on the file itself, then creating a new name for it
    would allow you to open it O_RDWR.

    I'm not 100% convinced by this argument. If you really want a
    particular user not to be able to write to a file, the certain answer
    is to set its permissions appropriately, rather than rely on it having
    no name.

    One could make the hypothetical flink(2) only work on O_RDWR file
    descriptors, or only on files owned by the euid of the calling

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