Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 3 Jan 2002 14:49:04 +1100 | From | Cameron Simpson <> | Subject | Re: ISA slot detection on PCI systems? |
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On Thu, Jan 03, 2002 at 12:04:57AM +0100, Lionel Bouton <Lionel.Bouton@free.fr> wrote: | Eric S. Raymond wrote: | > Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>: | >>So you want the lowest possible priviledge level. Because if so thats | >>setuid app not kernel space. Arguing about the same code in either kernel | >>space verus setuid app space is garbage. | >> | > But you're thinking like a developer, not a user. The right question | > is which approach requires the lowest level of *user* privilege to get | > the job done. Comparing world-readable /proc files versus a setuid app, | > the answer is obvious. | | Reading proc files requires running kernel space code, do we have kernel | space code running with *user* priviledge now?
Oh please don't inject (more) noise into this1 Doing ANYTHING involves running kerel space code somewhere. It is still possible to talk meaningfully about:
- opening a publicly readable file in /proc to get some info, which will run some kernel code (which can presumably be trusted; if you don't trust your kernel you have a serious problem)
versus
- running a setuid binary (however audited) to get the info; said binary may have bugs, security holes, race conditions etc; it may be hacked post boot (no so easy to do to the live kernel image), etc
Further, binaries which grovel in /dev/kmem tend to have to be kept in sync with the kernel; in-kernel code is fundamentally in sync. -- Cameron Simpson, DoD#743 cs@zip.com.au http://www.zip.com.au/~cs/
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