Messages in this thread | | | From | Robert Love <> | Date | 21 Aug 2001 17:50:41 -0400 |
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On Tue, 2001-08-21 at 14:29, David Wagner wrote: > Alex Bligh - linux-kernel wrote: > >For clarity, I'm saying Robert's patch is GOOD, and those who are trying > >to point out what I consider to be extremely theoretical weakness it > >introduces into /dev/random (and then, only when config'd on), [...] > > That's one place where we disagree. Over-estimating entropy is not a > theoretical weakness: this is something that real cryptographers get real > worried about. It's one of the easiest ways for a crypto system to fail.
Entirely agreed, but that is why we have SHA-1. If we assume SHA-1 is not crackable, then the entropy estimate is actually worthless. It exists because of the theoretical possibility of learning some state of the pool from a given read.
In theory, we dont need both SHA-1 hash and the entropy count. They exist to pacify a theoretical weakness in each.
Now, my net device patch should only be enabled in situations where both you trust SHA-1 (and I think most do) and you trust that reading net devices yields the full amount of entropy.
-- Robert M. Love rml at ufl.edu rml at tech9.net
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