Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 20 Aug 2001 10:55:00 -0400 | From | Chris Friesen <> | Subject | Re: /dev/random in 2.4.6 |
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Alex Bligh - linux-kernel wrote:
> An alternative approach to all of this, perhaps, would be to use extremely > finely grained timers (if they exist), in which case more bits of entropy > could perhaps be derived per sample, and perhaps sample them on > more operations. I don't know what the finest resolution timer we have > is, but I'd have thought people would be happier using ANY existing > mechanism (including network IRQs) if the timer resolution was (say) > 1 nanosecond.
Why don't we also switch to a cryptographically secure algorithm for /dev/urandom? Then we could seed it with a value from /dev/random and we would have a known number of cryptographically secure pseudorandom values. Once we reach the end of the png cycle, we could re-seed it with another value from /dev/random.
Would this be a valid solution, or am I totally off my rocker?
Chris
-- Chris Friesen | MailStop: 043/33/F10 Nortel Networks | work: (613) 765-0557 3500 Carling Avenue | fax: (613) 765-2986 Nepean, ON K2H 8E9 Canada | email: cfriesen@nortelnetworks.com - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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