Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sun, 19 Aug 2001 18:32:36 -0500 (CDT) | From | Oliver Xymoron <> | Subject | Re: /dev/random in 2.4.6 |
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On Sun, 19 Aug 2001, Theodore Tso wrote:
> The bottom line is it really depends on how paranoid you want to be, > and how much and how closely you want /dev/random to reliably replace > a true hardware random number generator which relies on some physical > process (by measuring quantum noise using a noise diode, or by > measuring radioactive decay). For most purposes, and against most > adversaries, it's probably acceptable to depend on network interrupts, > even if the entropy estimator may be overestimating things.
Can I propose an add_untrusted_randomness()? This would work identically to add_timer_randomness but would pass batch_entropy_store() 0 as the entropy estimate. The store would then be made to drop 0-entropy elements on the floor if the queue was more than, say, half full. This would let us take advantage of 'potential' entropy sources like network interrupts and strengthen /dev/urandom without weakening /dev/random.
(Yes, I see dont_count_entropy, but it doesn't appear to be used, and doesn't address flooding the queue with 0-entropy entries. I'd take it out.)
-- "Love the dolphins," she advised him. "Write by W.A.S.T.E.."
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