Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Sat, 18 Aug 2001 11:17:01 -0400 (EDT) | From | "Mr. James W. Laferriere" <> | Subject | Re: Encrypted Swap |
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Hello Ted , Thank you for bring us back on topic . I found the disertations on memory a tad enlightening . But I was very interested in the original thread of encrypting swap . Twyl , JimL
On Sat, 18 Aug 2001, Ted Unangst wrote: > On Sat, 18 Aug 2001, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > So the attacker has two way to attack your machine. Attempt to break > > in while it is still running. Put in a minimal boot cd and press > > reset and see how much is recovered. Generally breaking should prove > > the more fruitful course, but the fact that reset preseves all of the > > memory, means it simply is not safe for someone to have physical > > access to your machine while the power is on. > > if the machine is on, and you can get close to it, it's probably easier > just to use tempest radiation. it will also work at a distance, so it's > more likely to be a threat than grabbing RAM chips. a few points: > > 1. not everyone is going to bring their James Bond RAM Reader (tm) into > your building to extract data. a hardcore data thief, maybe, but it's not > common equipment. everyone will have access to an IDE or SCSI disk > reader. > > 2. RAM has a short window of oppurtunity. whatever it turns out to be, > RAM degrades faster than disk. it's not going to last while you drive it > home, unless you have a RAM refresher plugged in the cigarette lighter. > > 3. encrypted swap is meant for a different threat model. you assume that > the attacker might have access to the box at night or over a weekend, > while you're away. RAM will be off. if you think someone might be trying > to steal your RAM, you need better physical security. +------------------------------------------------------------------+ | James W. Laferriere | System Techniques | Give me VMS | | Network Engineer | P.O. Box 854 | Give me Linux | | babydr@baby-dragons.com | Coudersport PA 16915 | only on AXP | +------------------------------------------------------------------+
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