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    SubjectRe: Is this the ultimate stack-smash fix?
    "Eric W. Biederman" wrote:

    > Jeremy Jackson <jeremy.jackson@sympatico.ca> writes:
    >
    > > "Eric W. Biederman" wrote

    > No. I'm not talking about stack-guard patches. I'm talking about bounds checking.

    Sorry, I was quite incoherent. Many others have pointed out that there exist
    patches for non-executatble stack, and the problems with it. That's what I meant to
    comment on. But I'm glad to find out about bounds checking as an option.

    > But the gcc bounds checking work is the ultimate buffer overflow fix.
    > You can recompile all of your trusted applications, and libraries with
    > it and be safe from one source of bugs.

    That's why I was wondering of limiting privileged addresses security at a more
    fundamental level... as you say above,
    this fixes *ONE* source of bugs(security threats)... but itn't it inevitable that
    there will be others? But if services are each put
    in a separate box, that doesn't have a door leading to the inner sanctum, things would
    be more secure in spite of "bugs".

    Well I thank everyone for their responses in this thread, I think It's been beaten
    into the ground (my original idea),
    and I'm left with some food for thought.


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