Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 17 Dec 2001 15:58:53 -0800 | From | Andrew Morton <> | Subject | Re: Limits broken in 2.4.x kernel. |
| |
Trond Myklebust wrote: > > >>>>> " " == war <war@starband.net> writes: > > > Problem: Per-user process limits to not work correctly with a > > 2.4.x kernel. > > > Say I want to limit a user to [5] processes. > > > Example: Edit [/etc/security/limits.conf] > > user hard nproc 5 -or- @group hard nproc 5 > > > The result: The user cannot login. > > > How to fix? > > One thing I noticed when doing the BSD cred patch for 2.5.x is that > somebody broke the process accounting in 2.[45].x at least for the > case of reparent_to_init():
That would be me.
> If you just charge current->user without moving over the process from > the old uid to the new uid (such as is done in kernel/sys.c with the > set_user() routine) then you risk seriously corrupting the counters. > > I'm not sure really what the point was of setting the user in > reparent_to_init() in the first place, since it doesn't setreuid().
reparent_to_init() is there to cope with various strange things which occur when a kernel thread is parented by a userspace process. It's called after daemonize(), so the thread can no longer participate in filesystem related things.
I think what you've pointed out here is yet another problem with the idea of having kernel threads parented by user processes: they articificially increase the user's process count.
I didn't have a clear reason for moving the UID to root's - it just didn't seem a good idea to have kernel threads running with non-root UIDs. But we have a reason now - process accounting.
reparent_to_init() needs to decrement current->user's processes count, and increment root's. I'll do a patch.
- - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
| |