Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Wed, 3 Jan 2001 15:54:35 -0800 (PST) | From | Gerhard Mack <> | Subject | Re: [RFC] prevention of syscalls from writable segments, breaking bug exploits |
| |
On Wed, 3 Jan 2001, Dan Hollis wrote:
> On Thu, 4 Jan 2001, Dan Aloni wrote: > > Anyway, while it is agreed that you can't completely eliminate exploits, > > it is recommended that, it should be at least harder to create them, maybe > > it can even minimize the will to write them. > > The argument against these sort of protection mechanisms seems to be "well > its not perfect, so we shouldnt have it at all". > > Lets use that argument against uid/gid then. Since it's impossible to > protect against exploits, let's dispose of uid/gid entirely and run > everything as root ;-) > > "stack guarding is a false sense of security". Well, so is ipchains, so > lets discard that as well...? > > Really, these arguments cut both ways. If you are going to argue against > something because it's not perfect, you should be aware that you're > arguing against other kernel protection mechanisms also. >
Your comparing actual security with stack guarding? Stack guarding mearly makes the attack diffrent.. rootkits are already available to defeat it.
Gerhard
-- Gerhard Mack
gmack@innerfire.net
<>< As a computer I find your faith in technology amusing.
- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
|  |