Messages in this thread | | | From | "Khimenko Victor" <> | Date | Sun, 20 Feb 2000 04:13:49 +0300 (MSK) | Subject | Re: Capabilities |
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In <38AF2945.E714F508@bestbits.at> Andreas Gruenbacher (a.gruenbacher@bestbits.at) wrote: > On Sat, 19 Feb 2000 14:51:51 -0500 > Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote: >> >> [...] So the first question is whether we want to try to >> conform to the last POSIX draft, and (as much as possible) be compatible >> with the other Trusted Unixes out there.
> That's very important. Yes.
>> [...] >> Now, with all of that being said, if you don't want the full >> POSIX model, it's probably easier to simply leave things the way they >> are right now, and not try to put anything in the filesystem. Just >> simply allow programs to be setuid root, and then let them drop >> whatever capabilities they don't need as soon as they start running in >> main() --- hopefully before any stack overrun vulnerabilities have a >> chance to execute. :-)
> The kernel should boot up in non-trusted mode (with root and SUID root binaries > recieving full capabilities, as it's implemented now).
> A simple syscall could then switch the kernel to trusted mode. Afterwards, root > is treated as all other others.
> Switching to trusted mode then can easily be done in init scripts, ...
> Of course, there shouldn't be a way to switch back to non-trusted mode...
IMNSHO trusted mode or untrusted mode should be filesystem flag: in trusted mode LOTS of programs should be configured differently. Perhaps mount option will be enough. It's NOT system-wide issue, rather filesystem-wide (kernel works in trusted mode even now (modulo things like mtrr not yet converted to capabilities), just exec part work in non-trusted mode...
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