Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Tue, 14 Nov 2000 05:54:10 -0500 | From | Jakub Jelinek <> | Subject | Re: Modprobe local root exploit |
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On Tue, Nov 14, 2000 at 10:42:41AM +0000, Malcolm Beattie wrote: > Keith Owens writes: > > All these patches against request_module are attacking the problem at > > the wrong point. The kernel can request any module name it likes, > > using any string it likes, as long as the kernel generates the name. > > The real problem is when the kernel blindly accepts some user input and > > passes it straight to modprobe, then the kernel is acting like a setuid > > wrapper for a program that was never designed to run setuid. > > Rather than add sanity checking to modprobe, it would be a lot easier > and safer from a security audit point of view to have the kernel call > /sbin/kmodprobe instead of /sbin/modprobe. Then kmodprobe can sanitise > all the data and exec the real modprobe. That way the only thing that > needs auditing is a string munging/sanitising program.
Well, no matter what kernel needs auditing as well, the fact that dev_load will without any check load any module the user wants is already problematic and no munging helps with it at all, especially loading old ISA drivers might not be a good idea.
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