Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Tue, 14 Nov 2000 10:42:41 +0000 | From | Malcolm Beattie <> | Subject | Re: Modprobe local root exploit |
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Keith Owens writes: > All these patches against request_module are attacking the problem at > the wrong point. The kernel can request any module name it likes, > using any string it likes, as long as the kernel generates the name. > The real problem is when the kernel blindly accepts some user input and > passes it straight to modprobe, then the kernel is acting like a setuid > wrapper for a program that was never designed to run setuid.
Rather than add sanity checking to modprobe, it would be a lot easier and safer from a security audit point of view to have the kernel call /sbin/kmodprobe instead of /sbin/modprobe. Then kmodprobe can sanitise all the data and exec the real modprobe. That way the only thing that needs auditing is a string munging/sanitising program.
--Malcolm
-- Malcolm Beattie <mbeattie@sable.ox.ac.uk> Unix Systems Programmer Oxford University Computing Services - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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