Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 20 Jul 1999 14:30:27 +0100 (GMT) | From | Chris Evans <> | Subject | Re: [RFC] new kernel syscall |
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On Mon, 19 Jul 1999, Oliver Xymoron wrote:
> > because a daemon running as e.g. "gdm" can clear current->dumpable and > > then a breach of a different "gdm" sibling process finds itself unable to > > attach to its sibling and snoop passwords. > > As long as privileged users can still get around it. It would be annoying
Of course. The call would tap into the existing mechanism of current->dumpable. And current CAP_PTRACE allows to trace any process (except init!) regardless of dumpable, uid, gid, capabilities etc.
Chris
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