Messages in this thread | | | From | "Stephen C. Tweedie" <> | Date | Sat, 3 Jul 1999 01:40:31 +0100 (BST) | Subject | Re: [RFC] [PATCH] [SECURITY] tightening ioctl()'s |
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Hi,
On Fri, 2 Jul 1999 00:45:43 +0100 (GMT), Chris Evans <chris@ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk> said:
> Here are patches to make use of two ioctl()'s privileged. I outlined the > dangers in previous mails. Comments?
Unified or context diffs, please!!
> Patch 1) - APPLIES TO fs/ioctl.c
There is at least one user space program --- frag --- which uses FIBMAP to tell you the fragmentation on a file. I don't much care whether or not a user gets to see such stuff, so what exactly is the rationale for a change here?
> 20a21,22 >> if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) >> return -EPERM;
> Patch 2) - APPLIES TO fs/ext2/ioctl.c
No, the SETVERSION is designed for use by NFS servers, and they should be able to make the call with the fsuid of the requesting user.
--Stephen
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