[lkml]   [1999]   [Apr]   [20]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
    SubjectRe: capabilities in elf headers, (my) final (and shortest) iteration

    > > >>> ...and works only for some types of files (how about a webserver
    > > >>> written in Perl?).
    > [...]
    > > {Shrug} Perhaps somebody can suggest some way that capabilities can
    > > have meaning for a script, any script if it comes to that?
    > A script in Unix is just another random way to write a program that does
    > what I want. Nothing special there. Note that today's scripts are (almost)
    > undistinguishable from binary, compiled programs: They may carry the same
    > permissions (execute permissions for whom, even S[UG]ID bits (not on all
    > Unices, but several honor them)). If some scheme can't do the same (at least
    > in principle) for capabilities, it is fundamentally flawed. No "all
    > capable" interpreter should be needed, as this is a _huge_ security risk,
    > the kernel might as well endow this particular process with the requested
    > capabilities, and nothing else.

    Why is all capable interpretter huge security risk? Look at
    suidperl. It drops priviledges _then_ it looks at code, so overflow in
    its parsing routines is not going to help you.

    PS: Any all capable file is huge security risk. I do not see why
    interpretters are any worse :-).
    I'm really Pavel
    Look at ;-).

    To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
    the body of a message to
    Please read the FAQ at

     \ /
      Last update: 2005-03-22 13:51    [W:0.020 / U:5.292 seconds]
    ©2003-2016 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital OceanAdvertise on this site