Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 20 Apr 1999 12:53:46 +0200 | From | Pavel Machek <> | Subject | Re: capabilities in elf headers, (my) final (and shortest) iteration |
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Hi!
> > >>> ...and works only for some types of files (how about a webserver > > >>> written in Perl?). > > [...] > > > {Shrug} Perhaps somebody can suggest some way that capabilities can > > have meaning for a script, any script if it comes to that? > > A script in Unix is just another random way to write a program that does > what I want. Nothing special there. Note that today's scripts are (almost) > undistinguishable from binary, compiled programs: They may carry the same > permissions (execute permissions for whom, even S[UG]ID bits (not on all > Unices, but several honor them)). If some scheme can't do the same (at least > in principle) for capabilities, it is fundamentally flawed. No "all > capable" interpreter should be needed, as this is a _huge_ security risk, > the kernel might as well endow this particular process with the requested > capabilities, and nothing else.
Why is all capable interpretter huge security risk? Look at suidperl. It drops priviledges _then_ it looks at code, so overflow in its parsing routines is not going to help you.
Pavel PS: Any all capable file is huge security risk. I do not see why interpretters are any worse :-). -- I'm really pavel@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz. Pavel Look at http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/ ;-).
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