Messages in this thread | | | From | "Stephan K. Zitz" <> | Subject | RE: Linux-privs | Date | Sun, 29 Mar 1998 15:54:20 -0600 |
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> well, judging from lurking on their list and checking out patches > casually, it got completed to quite a level. suser() got extended in a way > to check for priviledge(s) required by the local kernel context. They also > got it fairly close to TrustedSolaris. The funny thing is that with their > scheme, a has_cap(CAP_RAWDISK) is about 3 lightweight assembly > instructions, about the same as you get from the broken BSD 'if > (securelevel > 0)' approach. [a has_cap(CAP_RAWDISK) expands to something > like a 'if (current->capmask & CAP_RAWDISK)']. And if you consider that > suser() is removed _completely_ [from that source point, it's still there > for migration reasons], it's even a speedup ... >
I'm curious
Why was Trusted Solaris chosen as the implementation to "[get]
fairly close to
"?
Where is/was this list available from?
Thanks
--Stephan zitz@erf.net
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