Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 13 Apr 1998 20:09:32 +0200 | From | ak@muc ... | Subject | Re: T/TCP: Syn and RST Cookies |
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On Mon, Apr 13, 1998 at 06:56:16PM +0200, David S. Miller wrote: > From: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> > Date: 13 Apr 1998 17:49:52 +0200 > > "David S. Miller" <davem@dm.cobaltmicro.com> writes: > > > We drop data in a SYN frame, relax pinhead. > > We could make it a sysctl. For all usual cases it would be no > slowdown in the critical path, because that part is never hit > anyways by SYNs without data. > > Nope, ain't gonna happen. Alan in his commentary was trying to hint > that allowing this to happen can open you to certain DoS attacks.
I should have writen: a sysctl, with the default to off, for better T/TCP interoperability for people in intranets where they don't care too much about DOS attacks.
Another point: we could limit the maximal data sized queued with the SYN - as long as sizeof(struct open_request) + maxpacketsize <= sizeof(struct sock) the situation is not worse than with stock 2.0 without syncookies ;)
T/TCP is often nice for small transactions where only a few bytes need to be reliably transfered. This check would allow that nicely.
-Andi
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