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    SubjectRe: Security patch for /proc
    On Tue, 31 Mar 1998, Chris Evans wrote:

    > On Tue, 31 Mar 1998, Jeremy Fitzhardinge wrote:
    > > Hi all,
    > >
    > > Here's a patch which prevents chrooted processes from escaping from
    > > their chrooted area via /proc.
    > Hi,
    > I'm not sure I agree with this approach -- perhaps root processes should
    > not be allowed to use the mount() syscall if root_dir != real_root. The
    > other main source of nastiness is ptrace() -- this needs to be banned in a
    > similar manner. There are other ways root could escape a chroot()
    > jail, we need to think about them and eliminate them one by one.
    - mknod()

    Other are not that nasty, but still nasty:
    - bind(): the lower ports are reserved to root, so another box may trust
    that a connection is coming from a system program, and not a
    user process.

    But before changing the WELL established rules about chroot (and root in a
    chroot environment was always dangerous), what about a new syscall:


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