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    SubjectRe: Linux login security approaches
    Date
    Wesley Morgan <morganw@engr.sc.edu> writes:
    > On Tue, 8 Dec 1998, Neil Conway wrote:
    >
    > > Jeez, wrong on both counts. No-one needs to replace /bin/login, simply
    > > print a message to the screen saying "Linux blah \n login:" and then
    > > wait for someone to take the bait.
    > >
    > > Secondly, NT's C-A-D requirement DOES prevent this, and thus DOES add
    > > security, AND to make things better, I don't see how it makes life any
    > > harder for users - it's just some keys you press to get a login screen.
    >
    > This whole argument is stupid... If you have access to the console then
    > chances are you don't need the root password to get root. Bring out your
    > handy floppy disk and manually edit /etc/shadow or whatever you want.

    You'll probably get a million responses to this but: if the PC's BIOS
    is password protected and set to not boot off of anything but the "C:"
    drive, this attack won't work. If the PC's case is physically locked
    so that it can't be easily opened, a cracker at the console will not
    be able to easily compromise the system.

    SAK is a good thing, and I wouldn't mind seeing Linux support it
    (optionally) in some form.

    --
    Mirian Crzig Lennox Systems Anarchist
    "There's a New World Order coming every minute.
    Make mine extra cheese."

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