Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 15 Oct 1998 14:53:02 +0100 | From | Jamie Lokier <> | Subject | Re: 2.2 imminent.. /proc security fix? |
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On Wed, Oct 14, 1998 at 06:49:02AM -0500, Mitchell Blank Jr wrote: > As for the /proc/PID/* problem is to just check permissions on each > read (I believe this is also done in the lastest 2.0's). The long > term solution would be to have a 64 bit process number that is used > internally in procfs. We shouldn't try to just garauntee that the PID > itself won't be reused - it gets hairy if in the future we want to move > to random PIDs (like OpenBSD) or some other scheme.
I fail to see why the open inode structure cannot be invalidated when a process is destroyed. Note, the inode _number_ remains reusable. The currently used structure (and dentry) should be invalidated. See fs/bad_inode.c, make_bad_inode().
-- Jamie
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