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    SubjectRe: Experimental yet interesting securelevel patch :-)

    On Fri, 22 Aug 1997, Baldur Norddahl wrote:

    > > Anyone wanting this kind of high security certainly isn't going to have a
    > > machine bouncing back into multi user mode after a reboot....
    > You don't need to criple the system that way to get full security. Just
    > mark all the lilo stuff, init and the startup scripts as immutable. Set
    > the securelevel in the startup scripts. Then the hacker will gain nothing
    > by rebooting.

    Mmmmm. Don't forget the kernel, the shell used to run the scripts, all
    libraries used by the shell. All other binaries invoked in the startup
    scripts. Kernel modules. No doubt loads more... get my point? Much
    better to prevent reboot from bringing machine back into a useable state.
    I like to implement this anyway -- if a Linux machine goes down I want to
    know _why_, as this is a rare event. If there is a genuine problem I want
    to be there to supervise the system attempt to limp back into existance.

    > Btw, is root prevented to write directly to the harddisk device? If not,
    > he can just go around the filesystem or make his own modifications to the
    > boot sector etc.

    All this and lots more is of course denied. I've tried to be thorough in
    what actions are disallowed, so there is _no_ _way_ root can mess with
    info on the disk by whatever cunning means. I've probably forgotten things
    though, so mail me when you find my errors...


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