Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 27 Nov 1997 10:42:42 +0000 | From | Richard Jones <> | Subject | Re: Linux proc exploit |
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Alan Cox wrote: > > > What if we had per-process securelevel flag, inherited at fork etc., which > > would make (f)suser return 0 everytime for these processes? > > A simple hack to do this is to make suser() check you are not chrooted > but you can equally have no root stuff in the chroot area
There was a discussion a while back on comp.security.unix (?) about whether it was possible to allow chroot() for ordinary users. The general conclusion seemed to be that it might be possible so long as chroot'd processes are not permitted to execute any suid programs. But there may be other nasty security implications to this ... Can anyone think of any objections? It would certainly be useful to allow, say, users' cgi-bin scripts to chroot to a safe environment to reduce security risks.
Chroot() is a very neat feature but because it is limited to root only, it's not very widely used.
Rich.
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