Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 15 Oct 1997 15:11:25 -0400 (EDT) | From | linux kernel account <> | Subject | Re: monitoring entropy |
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On Wed, 15 Oct 1997, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> time? I'm no cryptography dude, but i did read about the 'black box'
Even the crypto dudes agree: What we do is fine..
> Think about it. We cannot generate infinit amount of random output, based > on a finit amount of random input. Ie. the output wont be random. The more > output you give, the more information you expose, isnt it so?
Right, but you can generate cryptographily strong output. I.e. output that is very difficult to figure out.. Random = Impossible to guess. Crpytographicly strong = very difficult to guess. Very difficuly = more computer power then your or I could ever see..
There are even some arguments in Applied Crypto about cracking very difficult systems.. The assume eaisest case computation on a 128-bit key and show that it would take an obserd amount of energy to drive an Ideal computer to bruteforuce the keyspace.. I'm sure the same thing could be said here..
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