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SubjectRe: [linux-security] Malicious Linux modules (fwd)
The way to fix these types of problems is to add some kind of digital
signatures to modules and executables (and shared libs, loaders, etc,
everything in the chain).

Even as root, if I don't have access to the signing program and signature
information, and the object isn't signed by a recognized location (e.g.
Debian or Redhat), it wouldn't allow root to do anything a normal user
couldn't do - the euid would be permanently downgraded for unsigned
executables. viri couldn't compromise executables. Hackers could replace
some utilities with compromised versions, but the tracks would be more
obvious since they would need to leave the signed versions around.

It would still require care since any system can be defeated, but making
it more difficult could eliminate some attacks.

There are a few problems. DS requires crypto, and that can create export
problems with the code. Crypto is big - the DS algorithm would eat
another few hundred K out of the kernel.

--- reply to tzeruch - at - ceddec - dot - com ---


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