Messages in this thread |  | | From | "Andrew G. Morgan" <> | Subject | Re: signing a filesystem | Date | Thu, 2 Jan 1997 11:46:13 -0800 (PST) |
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Daniel A. Taylor wrote: > > > Encryption works better, because if your attacker cannot read the > > > > But addresses a different concern. It would also be (legally) difficult to ... > > such data is "correct". > > Encryption addresses the proper concern. An encrypted file > cannot be modified without decrypting it first. Any attempt > to modify it in it's encrypted state is likely to render the > file useless rather than simply changing the data by making > it impossible to decrypt. Therefore, if you are running on > an encrypted file system, any attempt to modify the files or > filesystem meta-data from outside the avenues provided by > the OS will result in filesystem corruption. If file system > integrity *OR* security is important enough to care, it is > better to have to do a full filesystem restore if either is > suspect than risk the loss of either.
This is not a flame. Don't get me wrong, encryption is marvelous. Use it if and where you can. But what if you can't? (Cross your fingers?)
Regards
Andrew -- Linux-PAM, libpwdb, Orange-Linux and Linux-GSS http://parc.power.net/morgan/index.html [ For those that prefer FTP --- ftp://ftp.lalug.org/morgan ]
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