lkml.org 
[lkml]   [1996]   [Jul]   [11]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
From
SubjectRe: Misc Fixes
Date
Hi,

> > Not allowing module loads is reasonable, actually. That does NOT change the
> > fact that no module should access "securelevel", which is the original problem.
>
> Yes. Allowing module loads has to be blocked by securelevel

This would make the use of kerneld impossible. I suggest to

- Mark the modules immuteable using the immutable file attribute.
- Allow only loading of modules owned by root and marked immutable.
- Loading of modules from filesystems that don't support the immutable
attribute is forbidden. This prevents the (ab)use of certain filesystem
like NFS etc.
- A mechanism that allows to limit loading of modules to certain programs:
In case of kerneld require that it's inode is also immuteable and
owned by root or kerneld must have been started before the securelevel
was raised.

I think this policy for the loading of modules should be acceptable from
both point of security and useability of modules.

Ralf


\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2005-03-22 13:37    [W:0.124 / U:0.712 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site