Messages in this thread |  | | From | (H. Peter Anvin) | Subject | Re: Proposed change to setre[ug]id() | Date | 19 Jun 1996 01:08:19 GMT |
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Followup to: <199606190223.EAA26021@hera.cuci.nl> By author: srb@cuci.nl (Stephen R. van den Berg) In newsgroup: linux.dev.kernel > > "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@MIT.EDU> wrote: > >There are two problems; one is the one you pointed out, and the other is > >programs which drop the setuid bits, thinking they are then secure, and > >then start doing unsafe things like using gets() and statically-sized > >buffers on the stack. > > Hmmm..., indeed, and then construct a setuid() system call. > Well, in that light, the current code looks just fine as it is.
I have only one comment: dlopen().
Just because you're in the same process (no exec) doesn't mean the code comes from the same file.
If we want to emulate HP/UX's setresuid() facility, then let's implement a setresuid() call [maybe that should be setresfuid()], but don't break the current setreuid() implementation -- ESPECIALLY not since it would make secure programs suddenly insecure!
-hpa
-- PGP public key available - finger hpa@zytor.com I don't work for Yggdrasil, but they sponsor the linux.* hierarchy. "The earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens." -- Bahá'u'lláh Just Say No to Morden * Save Babylon 5: http://www.babylon5.com/cmp/support/
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