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    SubjectRe: Proposed change to setre[ug]id()
    Followup to:  <>
    By author: (Stephen R. van den Berg)
    In newsgroup:
    > "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@MIT.EDU> wrote:
    > >There are two problems; one is the one you pointed out, and the other is
    > >programs which drop the setuid bits, thinking they are then secure, and
    > >then start doing unsafe things like using gets() and statically-sized
    > >buffers on the stack.
    > Hmmm..., indeed, and then construct a setuid() system call.
    > Well, in that light, the current code looks just fine as it is.

    I have only one comment: dlopen().

    Just because you're in the same process (no exec) doesn't mean the
    code comes from the same file.

    If we want to emulate HP/UX's setresuid() facility, then let's
    implement a setresuid() call [maybe that should be setresfuid()], but
    don't break the current setreuid() implementation -- ESPECIALLY not
    since it would make secure programs suddenly insecure!


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