Messages in this thread |  | | From | Marek Michalkiewicz <> | Subject | Re: As 2.0 looms | Date | Mon, 6 May 1996 19:20:47 +0200 (MET DST) |
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> > - /proc is still insecure :-(. You can open /proc/<pid>/mem and > > hold the file descriptor, then have the target process exec some > > setuid/setgid/unreadable program and read its memory at will. > > Not good for things like ssh - the secret host key is there... > > Oh, ****, has this _still_ not been fixed ?
Quick fix in .96, but breaks at least some versions of strace. Changed in .98 - strace works again, but I think there may be a race condition if read() passes the checks, sleeps on memcpy_tofs() due to a swap-in, and the target process execs a setuid program in this time window.
> If I revamp my /proc-paranoia patch for 1.3.x, will it get accepted, > or should I not bother ?
Ask Linus :-). He might not like encoding the flag in the sticky bit of /proc - maybe add a struct proc_sb_info containing mount flags (there might be more in the future) like other filesystems do.
Marek
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