Messages in this thread |  | | From | Alan Cox <> | Subject | Re: /proc/<pid>/mem unreadable | Date | Thu, 9 May 1996 09:56:38 +0100 (BST) |
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> I was thinking that it would be good to add all the checks to > let suid scripts run in a secure manner. I think it would involve > resolving symlinks to find the true inode which would be used as > the file. Then of course the inode needs a filename, so we > generate one in /proc/suidexec. (damn unix filesystem...)
You'd have inconsistencies because you'd need to block them over NFS file systems where you can't lock down an inode in that way.
> You would also need a shell that ignores $IFS and such. > You could call that a user space issue, or you could just > completely clear the environment.
So you have a setuid wrapper like everyone else does nowdays - a secure C program that therefore avoids the setuid script issue.
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