Messages in this thread |  | | From | "Andrew G. Morgan" <> | Subject | Re: Allowing users to set set[ug]id bits | Date | Thu, 19 Dec 1996 11:53:08 -0800 (PST) |
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Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote: > From: marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl (Marek Michalkiewicz) > Date: Wed, 18 Dec 1996 19:10:51 +0100 (MET) > > BTW, the idea is not mine - SCO UNIX supports something like this, so > I thought it would be good to have that in Linux too (SCO sucks when > it comes to performance, but they have some nice security features; > I think we can have both performance and security). Quoting from the > SCO man page: > > setpriv(S) > > This is part of the POSIX.6 security specification, which is something > *additional* that you can layer on top of Linux. Note that it doesn't > turn completely destroy the ability to make setuid programs, but it > allows the system administrator to restrict (and many other things) on a > very fine-grained basis.
It might also be considered as a pre-requisite for ever getting Linux to C2 [See the *first* paragraph of the C2 discussion (paragraph 2.2.1.1) in the Orange book: ftp://csrc.nist.gov/pub/csrc/secpubs/rainbow/index.html ].
Best wishes
Andrew
PS. Personally, I like LD's remarks about an API+modular kernel approach to decisions of this sort. I could imagine a future in which you slot in your prefered module for D (for those that want security like that found in DOS) through C1-2, B1-2-3 or whatever you like....
-- Linux-PAM: http://parc.power.net/morgan/Linux-PAM/index.html libpwdb: http://parc.power.net/morgan/libpwdb/index.html
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