Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Mon, 16 Dec 1996 16:09:25 -0800 (PST) | From | "Alexander G. Burchell" <> | Subject | Re: Proposal: restrict link(2) |
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Excerpts from Mail.kernel: 16-Dec-96 Re: Proposal: restrict link(2) marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pw (342*)
> Theodore Y. Ts'o: > > Someone in Devel can trivial give write access to Beta Report merely by > > leaving a setgid devel program in their homedirectory.
> I don't see any good reasons why ordinary users should be allowed > to set set[ug]id bits. Perhaps that should be disallowed (at least > as an option)? Would it break any standards?
> Marek
Hi, I've kept silent for a while about this pollution but I think it's time to say something.
#1: This is not a kernel issue! This is a security issue! Once anyone decides what needs to be fixed/updated in the kernel to "fix" any security problems, the changes are so minor that they are not worth discussing on a __kernel development list__.
#2: Just because someone sees "no good reason" for something doesn't mean there is no such reason.
#3: Gratuitously changing kernel interfaces should be avoided whenever possible. It just reduces the code base which can be run. Even if there's "no good reason" for something, just the fact that it has been done that way for many years should be argument enough to keep it, lacking any __compelling __ argument to the contrary.
That's all, thanks.
Alexander G. Burchell http://www.pacificnet.net/~agb/ agb@pacificnet.net
P.S. Ordinary users running setuid or setgid programs allows ordinary users to write programs that can be run by many other ordinary users and share data files in the author's home directory. Any bugs or security leaks created by such programs are the __AUTHOR'S RESPONSIBILITY__.
A.
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