Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | Breno Leitao <> | Subject | [PATCH v3 09/10] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for Spectre V2 | Date | Mon, 22 Apr 2024 09:58:23 -0700 |
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Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated, where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and could not be controlled at build time.
Create an entry for the Spectre V2 CPU mitigation under CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS. This allow users to enable or disable it at compilation time.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 9 +++++---- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index fdf1c894fcb8..4f69a7f5f675 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2719,6 +2719,18 @@ config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V1 memory access bounds check. See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst> +config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 + bool "Mitigate SPECTRE V2 hardware bug" + default y + help + Enable mitigation for Spectre V2 (Branch Target Injection). Spectre + V2 is a class of side channel attacks that takes advantage of + indirect branch predictors inside the processor. In Spectre variant 2 + attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect branches in the + victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target buffer of a CPU + used for predicting indirect branch addresses. + See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst> + config MITIGATION_SRBDS bool "Mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) hardware bug" depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 49b60c0e2eb4..5628a77281fe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1457,17 +1457,18 @@ static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) { - enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd; char arg[20]; int ret, i; + cmd = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) ? SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") || cpu_mitigations_off()) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg)); if (ret < 0) - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + return cmd; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) { if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option)) @@ -1477,8 +1478,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) } if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) { - pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to default mode\n", arg); + return cmd; } if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE || -- 2.43.0
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