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SubjectRe: [PATCH V37 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
+++ Matthew Garrett [01/08/19 13:42 -0700]:
>On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 7:22 AM Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> wrote:
>> Apologies if this was addressed in another patch in your series (I've
>> only skimmed the first few), but what should happen if the kernel is
>> locked down, but CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=n? Or shouldn't CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
>> depend on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG? Otherwise I think we'll end up calling
>> the empty !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG module_sig_check() stub even though
>> lockdown is enabled.
>
>Hm. Someone could certainly configure their kernel in that way. I'm
>not sure that tying CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM to CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
>is the right solution, since the new LSM approach means that any other
>LSM could also impose the same policy. Perhaps we should just document
>this?

Hi Matthew,

If you're confident that a hard dependency is not the right approach,
then perhaps we could add a comment in the Kconfig (You could take a
look at the comment under MODULE_SIG_ALL in init/Kconfig for an
example)? If someone is configuring the kernel on their own then it'd
be nice to let them know, otherwise having a lockdown kernel without
module signatures would defeat the purpose of lockdown no? :-)

Thank you,

Jessica

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