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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH v2] mm: slub: print kernel addresses in slub debug messages
On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, miles.chen@mediatek.com wrote:
> Possible approaches are:
> 1. stop printing kernel addresses
> 2. print with %pK,
> 3. print with %px.

No. The point of obscuring kernel addresses is that if the attacker manages to find a way to get the kernel to spit out some debug messages that we shouldn't
leak all this extra information.

> 4. do nothing

5. Find something more useful to print.

> INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)

... you don't have any randomness on your platform?

> INFO: Object 0x(____ptrval____) @offset=1408 fp=0x(____ptrval____)
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> ...
> FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0x(____ptrval____) not freed

But if you have randomness, at least some of these "pointers" are valuable
because you can compare them against "pointers" printed by other parts
of the kernel.

> After this patch:
>
> INFO: Slab 0xffffffbf00f57000 objects=25 used=23 fp=0xffffffc03d5c3500
> INFO: Object 0xffffffc03d5c3500 @offset=13568 fp=0xffffffc03d5c0800
> Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000010: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000020: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000030: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000040: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000050: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000060: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000070: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Object 00000000: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000010: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000020: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000030: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000040: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000050: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000060: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000070: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5
> Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Padding 00000000: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> Padding 00000010: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> Padding 00000020: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> Padding 00000030: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> ...
> FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0xffffffc03d5c3500 not freed

It looks prettier, but I'm not convinced it's more useful. Unless your
platform lacks randomness ...

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