Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 9 Aug 2018 08:53:06 +0200 | From | Pavel Machek <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption |
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Hi!
> > Define unsafe. > > > > If you want security against bad people resuming your machines, please > Yes, this is one of the requirements.
> > But I thought you were trying to do something for secure boot, and "bad > > person resumes your machine" is out of scope there. > > > Not exactly, secure boot is one solution to meet the requirement.
Is it? AFAICT secure boot is something else. "Not even owner can see kernel memory".
> > So please always explain security against _what kind of attack_ you > > are trying to improve; intelligent communication is not possible > > without that. > > > User requirement: > A is the user, B is the attacker, user A launches a STD and > encrypts A's ram data, then writes these encrypted data onto > the disk, so that: Even if user B has access to the disk, > B could not know the content of A. Which implies: > 1. If B unplugs the disk from A's machine, and plugs the disk onto > another machine, B could not decode the content without A's > 'permission'. > 2. If B is using the same machine as A, even A has walked away leaving > the system suspend, B could not resume to A's context without > A's 'permission'.
Ok. Let's call this "effective resume password".
> Previously, there are three proposal for this: > a. Enhance the uswsusp(Pavel)
Actually you don't have to enhance anything. Uswsusp already provides "effective resume password".
If you only want to ask for password on resume, RSA is needed.
> Then let's talk a little more about secure boot. According > to my understanding, the situation secure boot tries to deal > with is a little different from the user case we raised above - > It is an enhancement for case 1, because it refuses to resume > once the machine is changed. And it does not cover case 2. But > if it is a requirement from the user, that's ok.
That does not match my understanding of secure boot. Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html [unhandled content-type:application/pgp-signature] | |