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    Subject[PATCH v3 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux determination of side-channel
    Date
    SELinux considers tasks to be side-channel safe if they
    have FILE__READ access.

    Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
    ---
    security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++++++
    1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

    diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
    index a8bf324130f5..992f2402edaa 100644
    --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
    +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
    @@ -4219,6 +4219,14 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
    spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
    }

    +static int selinux_task_safe_sidechannel(struct task_struct *p)
    +{
    + struct av_decision avd;
    +
    + return avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p),
    + SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, 0, &avd);
    +}
    +
    /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
    static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
    struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
    @@ -7002,6 +7010,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
    LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
    LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
    LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
    + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_safe_sidechannel, selinux_task_safe_sidechannel),

    LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
    LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
    --
    2.17.1
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