Messages in this thread | | | From | Andy Shevchenko <> | Date | Fri, 1 Jun 2018 13:49:41 +0300 | Subject | Re: ptrval hiding -- first kernel messages look rather "interesting" |
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On Fri, Jun 1, 2018 at 1:31 PM, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> wrote: > Hi! > > v4.17 on n900: > > [ 0.000000] Virtual kernel memory layout: > [ 0.000000] vector : 0xffff0000 - 0xffff1000 ( 4 kB) > [ 0.000000] fixmap : 0xffc00000 - 0xfff00000 (3072 kB) > [ 0.000000] vmalloc : 0xd0000000 - 0xff800000 ( 760 MB) > [ 0.000000] lowmem : 0xc0000000 - 0xcff00000 ( 255 MB) > [ 0.000000] pkmap : 0xbfe00000 - 0xc0000000 ( 2 MB) > [ 0.000000] modules : 0xbf000000 - 0xbfe00000 ( 14 MB) > [ 0.000000] .text : 0x(ptrval) - 0x(ptrval) (8160 kB) > [ 0.000000] .init : 0x(ptrval) - 0x(ptrval) (1024 kB) > [ 0.000000] .data : 0x(ptrval) - 0x(ptrval) ( 309 kB) > [ 0.000000] .bss : 0x(ptrval) - 0x(ptrval) ( 333 kB) > [ 0.000000] NR_IRQS: 16, nr_irqs: 16, preallocated irqs: 16 > > I mean -- security is nice, but perhaps we should adjust the messages > so this does not look like we are making fun of the user?
Colleague of mine (perhaps you even know him) wrote recently a small patch that improves kernel by 400% by removing ptr_to_id() completely.
Okay, joking is joking, but it was a proposal to have some command line option to enforce no-hash pointers. I would rather enable it when one of the existing option is present (like 'debug'), though it might alter the output in user space or something else. So, I have no strong opinion here.
-- With Best Regards, Andy Shevchenko
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