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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3] isdn: eicon: fix a missing-check bug
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From: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Date: Mon, 21 May 2018 01:58:07 -0500

> In divasmain.c, the function divas_write() firstly invokes the function
> diva_xdi_open_adapter() to open the adapter that matches with the adapter
> number provided by the user, and then invokes the function diva_xdi_write()
> to perform the write operation using the matched adapter. The two functions
> diva_xdi_open_adapter() and diva_xdi_write() are located in diva.c.
>
> In diva_xdi_open_adapter(), the user command is copied to the object 'msg'
> from the userspace pointer 'src' through the function pointer 'cp_fn',
> which eventually calls copy_from_user() to do the copy. Then, the adapter
> number 'msg.adapter' is used to find out a matched adapter from the
> 'adapter_queue'. A matched adapter will be returned if it is found.
> Otherwise, NULL is returned to indicate the failure of the verification on
> the adapter number.
>
> As mentioned above, if a matched adapter is returned, the function
> diva_xdi_write() is invoked to perform the write operation. In this
> function, the user command is copied once again from the userspace pointer
> 'src', which is the same as the 'src' pointer in diva_xdi_open_adapter() as
> both of them are from the 'buf' pointer in divas_write(). Similarly, the
> copy is achieved through the function pointer 'cp_fn', which finally calls
> copy_from_user(). After the successful copy, the corresponding command
> processing handler of the matched adapter is invoked to perform the write
> operation.
>
> It is obvious that there are two copies here from userspace, one is in
> diva_xdi_open_adapter(), and one is in diva_xdi_write(). Plus, both of
> these two copies share the same source userspace pointer, i.e., the 'buf'
> pointer in divas_write(). Given that a malicious userspace process can race
> to change the content pointed by the 'buf' pointer, this can pose potential
> security issues. For example, in the first copy, the user provides a valid
> adapter number to pass the verification process and a valid adapter can be
> found. Then the user can modify the adapter number to an invalid number.
> This way, the user can bypass the verification process of the adapter
> number and inject inconsistent data.
>
> This patch reuses the data copied in
> diva_xdi_open_adapter() and passes it to diva_xdi_write(). This way, the
> above issues can be avoided.
>
> Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>

Applied and queued up for -stable.

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