Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH 2/3] crypto: ccp - return an actual key size from RSA max_size callback | From | "Hook, Gary" <> | Date | Fri, 2 Mar 2018 17:49:07 -0600 |
| |
On 3/2/2018 5:15 PM, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote: > On 02.03.2018 17:44, Herbert Xu wrote: >> On Sat, Feb 24, 2018 at 05:03:21PM +0100, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote: >>> rsa-pkcs1pad uses a value returned from a RSA implementation max_size >>> callback as a size of an input buffer passed to the RSA implementation for >>> encrypt and sign operations. >>> >>> CCP RSA implementation uses a hardware input buffer which size depends only >>> on the current RSA key length, so it should return this key length in >>> the max_size callback, too. >>> This also matches what the kernel software RSA implementation does. >>> >>> Previously, the value returned from this callback was always the maximum >>> RSA key size the CCP hardware supports. >>> This resulted in this huge buffer being passed by rsa-pkcs1pad to CCP even >>> for smaller key sizes and then in a buffer overflow when ccp_run_rsa_cmd() >>> tried to copy this large input buffer into a RSA key length-sized hardware >>> input buffer. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name> >>> Fixes: ceeec0afd684 ("crypto: ccp - Add support for RSA on the CCP") >>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org >> >> Patch applied. Thanks. > > Thanks. > > However, what about the first patch from this series? > Without it, while it no longer should cause a buffer overflow, in-kernel > X.509 certificate verification will still fail with CCP driver loaded > (since CCP RSA implementation has a higher priority than the software > RSA implementation). > > Maciej >
I commented on that one here: https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=151986452422791&w=2
Effectively a NACK. We are a reviewing a proposed patch right now.
| |