lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2018]   [Mar]   [1]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
SubjectRe: [PATCH v2 0/2] STM32 Extended TrustZone Protection driver
From
Date
On 01/03/18 14:15, Benjamin Gaignard wrote:
> 2018-03-01 15:02 GMT+01:00 Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>:
>> On Thu, Mar 01, 2018 at 02:58:04PM +0100, Benjamin Gaignard wrote:
>>> On early boot stages STM32MP1 platform is able to dedicate some hardware blocks
>>> to a secure OS running in TrustZone.
>>> We need to avoid using those hardware blocks on non-secure context (i.e. kernel)
>>> because read/write accesses could generate illegale access exceptions.
>>>
>>> Extended TrustZone Protection driver make sure that device is disabled if
>>> non-secure world can't acces to it.
>>>
>>> version 2:
>>> - do not use notifier anymore
>>> - change status property value in device-tree if needed
>>> - use a list of phandle instead of hard coded array
>>
>> As mentioned on v1, I don't think this should be done in Linux at all.
>>
>> If you wish to handle this dynamically, please fixup the DT *before*
>> entering Linux.
>>
>> If you want a sane default in the dts file, put status = "disabled" on
>> all nodes which the secure world might take ownership of.
>
> That is the case, nodes are disabled by ealier boot stages before entering
> in Linux but, since mistakes and/or errors are always possible, fixup the DT
> to avoid illegal access exceptions make sense for me.

So why not also run a test on the memory controller in case the
bootloader made a mistake in the memory node too? As I mentioned before,
if you can't trust the DT to describe your hardware correctly you've
already lost.

Robin.

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2018-03-01 15:20    [W:0.502 / U:0.592 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site