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SubjectRe: [PATCH RFC] x86: KASAN: Sanitize unauthorized irq stack access
On Thu, Feb 08, 2018 at 01:03:49PM +0300, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
> On 07.02.2018 21:38, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > On 02/07/2018 08:14 AM, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
> >> Sometimes it is possible to meet a situation,
> >> when irq stack is corrupted, while innocent
> >> callback function is being executed. This may
> >> happen because of crappy drivers irq handlers,
> >> when they access wrong memory on the irq stack.
> >
> > Can you be more clear about the actual issue? Which drivers do this?
> > How do they even find an IRQ stack pointer?
>
> I can't say actual driver making this, because I'm still investigating the guilty one.
> But I have couple of crash dumps with the crash inside update_sd_lb_stats() function,
> where stack variable sg becomes corrupted. This time all scheduler-related not-stack
> variables are in ideal state. And update_sd_lb_stats() is the function, which can't
> corrupt its own stack. So, I thought this functionality may be useful for something else,
> especially because of irq stack is one of the last stacks, which are not sanitized.
> Task's stacks are already covered, as I know
>
> [1595450.678971] Call Trace:
> [1595450.683991] <IRQ>
> [1595450.684038]
> [1595450.688926] [<ffffffff81320005>] cpumask_next_and+0x35/0x50
> [1595450.693984] [<ffffffff810d91d3>] find_busiest_group+0x143/0x950
> [1595450.699088] [<ffffffff810d9b7a>] load_balance+0x19a/0xc20
> [1595450.704289] [<ffffffff810cde55>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x85/0xc0
> [1595450.709457] [<ffffffff810c29aa>] ? update_rq_clock.part.88+0x1a/0x150
> [1595450.714711] [<ffffffff810da770>] rebalance_domains+0x170/0x2b0
> [1595450.719997] [<ffffffff810da9d2>] run_rebalance_domains+0x122/0x1e0
> [1595450.725321] [<ffffffff816bb10f>] __do_softirq+0x10f/0x2aa
> [1595450.730746] [<ffffffff816b62ac>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
> [1595450.736169] [<ffffffff8102d325>] do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
> [1595450.741754] [<ffffffff81093ec5>] irq_exit+0x105/0x110
> [1595450.747279] [<ffffffff816baad2>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x42/0x50
> [1595450.752905] [<ffffffff816b7a62>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x232/0x240
> [1595450.758519] <EOI>
> [1595450.758569]
> [1595450.764100] [<ffffffff8152f282>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x52/0xc0
> [1595450.769652] [<ffffffff8152f3c8>] cpuidle_idle_call+0xd8/0x210
> [1595450.775198] [<ffffffff8103540e>] arch_cpu_idle+0xe/0x30
> [1595450.780813] [<ffffffff810effba>] cpu_startup_entry+0x14a/0x1c0
> [1595450.786286] [<ffffffff810523e6>] start_secondary+0x1d6/0x250

I'm not seeing how this patch would help. If you're running on the irq
stack, the *entire* irq stack would be unpoisoned. So there's still no
KASAN protection. Or am I missing something?

Seems like it would be more useful for KASAN to detect redzone accesses
on the irq stack (if it's not doing that already).

--
Josh

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