Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [v2,03/11] arm64: Take into account ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV3 | From | Marc Zyngier <> | Date | Mon, 8 Jan 2018 17:52:20 +0000 |
| |
On 08/01/18 17:40, Jayachandran C wrote: > On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 09:20:09AM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote: >> On 08/01/18 07:24, Jayachandran C wrote: >>> On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 01:12:33PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote: >>>> For non-KASLR kernels where the KPTI behaviour has not been overridden >>>> on the command line we can use ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV3 to determine whether >>>> or not we should unmap the kernel whilst running at EL0. >>>> >>>> Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> >>>> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> >>>> --- >>>> arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 1 + >>>> arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 8 +++++++- >>>> 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >>>> >>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h >>>> index 08cc88574659..ae519bbd3f9e 100644 >>>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h >>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h >>>> @@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ >>>> #define ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT 0 >>>> >>>> /* id_aa64pfr0 */ >>>> +#define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT 60 >>>> #define ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT 32 >>>> #define ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT 24 >>>> #define ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT 20 >>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c >>>> index 9f0545dfe497..d723fc071f39 100644 >>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c >>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c >>>> @@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { >>>> }; >>>> >>>> static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = { >>>> + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT, 4, 0), >>>> ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT, 4, 0), >>>> ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT, 4, 0), >>>> S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_NI), >>>> @@ -851,6 +852,8 @@ static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forced, >0: forced on, <0: forced off */ >>>> static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, >>>> int __unused) >>>> { >>>> + u64 pfr0 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); >>>> + >>>> /* Forced on command line? */ >>>> if (__kpti_forced) { >>>> pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation forced %s by command line option\n", >>>> @@ -862,7 +865,9 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, >>>> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) >>>> return true; >>>> >>>> - return false; >>>> + /* Defer to CPU feature registers */ >>>> + return !cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, >>>> + ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT); >>> >>> If I read this correctly, this enables KPTI on all processors without the CSV3 >>> set (which seems to be a future capability). >>> >>> Turning on KPTI has a small but significant overhead, so I think we should turn >>> it off on processors that are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-5754. Can we add something >>> like this: >>> >>> --->8 >>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c >>> index 19ed09b..202b037 100644 >>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c >>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c >>> @@ -862,6 +862,13 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, >>> return __kpti_forced > 0; >>> } >>> >>> + /* Don't force KPTI for CPUs that are not vulnerable */ >>> + switch (read_cpuid_id() & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) { >>> + case MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2: >>> + case MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN: >>> + return false; >>> + } >>> + >>> /* Useful for KASLR robustness */ >>> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) >>> return true; >>> >> >> KPTI is also an improvement for KASLR. Why would you deprive a user of >> the choice to further secure their system? > > The user has a choice with kpti= at the kernel command line, so we are > not depriving the user of a choice. KASLR is expected to be enabled by > distributions, and KPTI will be enabled by default as well. > > On systems that are not vulnerable to variant 3, this is an unnecessary > overhead.
KASLR can be defeated if you don't have KPTI enabled. The original KAISER paper is quite clear about that.
Thanks,
M. -- Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...
| |