lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2018]   [Jan]   [25]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation

----- dave.hansen@intel.com wrote:

> On 01/23/2018 03:13 AM, Liran Alon wrote:
> > Therefore, breaking KASLR. In order to handle this, every exit from
> > kernel-mode to user-mode should stuff RSB. In addition, this
> stuffing
> > of RSB may need to be done from a fixed address to avoid leaking
> the
> > address of the RSB stuffing itself.
>
> With PTI alone in place, I don't see how userspace could do anything
> with this information. Even if userspace started to speculate to a
> kernel address, there is nothing at the kernel address to execute: no
> TLB entry, no PTE to load, nothing.
>
> You probably have a valid point about host->guest, though.

I see it differently.

It is true that attacker cannot speculate to a kernel-address, but it doesn't mean it cannot use the leaked kernel-address together with another unrelated vulnerability to build a reliable exploit.

Security is built in layers.
The purpose of KASLR is to break the reliablity of an exploit which relies on vulnerability primitives such as: memory-corruption of a kernel-address, hijack kernel control-flow to a kernel-address or even just read a kernel-address. In modern exploitation, it is common to chain multiple different vulnerabilities in order to build a reliable exploit. Therefore, leaking a kernel-address could be exactly the missing primitive to complete a vulnerability-chain of a reliable exploit.

I don't see a big difference between leaking a kernel-address from user-mode vs. leaking a hypervisor-address from guest. They are both useful just as a primitive which is part of an exploit chain.

One could argue though, that currently KASLR is fundementally broken and therefore should not be considered a security boundary anymore. This argument could be legit as there were some well-known techniques that could break KASLR before KPTI patch-set was introduced (e.g. Timing memory accesses to kernel-addresses and messure reliably by leveraging TSX). Another well-known argument against KASLR is that it is a non-deterministic mitigation which some argue is not good enough. However, I think that if we decide KASLR is not a security boundary anymore, it should be made loud and clear.

In general, I think there are some info-leak vulnerabilities in our current mitigation plan which doesn't seem to be addressed. I will be glad if we could address them clearly. These are all the open issues as I see them:

1) Because IBRS doesn't restrict low prediction-mode code from using BTB of high prediction-mode code, It is possible to info-leak addresses from high prediction-mode code to low prediciton-mode code.
This is the KASLR breakage discussed above. Again, could be ignored if we discard KASLR as a security boundary.

2) Both IBRS & retpoline don't prevent use of BHB of high prediction-mode code from being used by low prediction-mode code. Therefore, low prediction-mode code could deduce the conditional branches taken by high prediction-mode code.

3) Similar leak to (1) exists from the fact that RSB entries of high prediction-mode code could be leaked by low prediction-mode code which may reveal kernel-addresses. Again, we could decide that this isn't a security boundary. An alternative to solve this could be to just stuff RSB from a fixed address between prediction-mode transitions.

-Liran

P.S:
It seems to me that all these issues could be resolved completely at hardware in future CPUs if BTB/BHB/RSB entries were tagged with prediction-mode (or similar metadata). It will be nice if Intel/AMD could share if that is the planned long-term solution instead of IBRS-all-the-time.

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2018-01-26 03:20    [W:0.082 / U:1.500 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site