lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2018]   [Jan]   [24]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [PATCH v8 04/12] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
On Wed, 24 Jan 2018, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:

> > > I just thought since you were already using modversions in enterprise
> > > distros already, that adding it there would be the simplest.
> >
> > The patch as-is introduces immediate modversion mismatch between
> > retpolined kernel and non-retpolined module, making each and every one
> > fail to load.
>
> Good, the patch works then, because I thought that not loading
> non-retpolined modules in a kernel that was built with retpoline was the
> goal here.

No, we do not want to break loading of externally-built modules just
because they might contain indirect calls.

Warning in such situations / tainting the kernel / reporting "might be
vulnerable" in sysfs should be the proper way to go.

retpolines are not kernel ABI (towards modules) breaker, so let's not
pretend it is.

Thanks,

--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2018-01-24 15:04    [W:1.212 / U:0.164 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site