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SubjectRe: [PATCHv3 1/2] capability: introduce sysctl for controlled user-ns capability whitelist
On Sat, Dec 30, 2017 at 12:50 AM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
<mtk.manpages@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hello Mahesh,
>
> On 12/05/2017 11:31 PM, Mahesh Bandewar wrote:
>> From: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
>>
>> Add a sysctl variable kernel.controlled_userns_caps_whitelist. This
>> takes input as capability mask expressed as two comma separated hex
>> u32 words. The mask, however, is stored in kernel as kernel_cap_t type.
>
> Just by the way, why is it not expressed as a 64 bit value? (The answer
> to that question should I think be part of this commit message.)
>
I think I mentioned in the earlier threads but it's as simple as using
the existing kernel API that deals with larger bit masks/arrays.
Capability mask is an array of u32 and one cannot guarantee that
kernel_cap_t is only 64 bits. So expressing it as u32 hex values makes
logical sense. Yes, one can simplify this even further and make this
sysctl accept string values. But bringing possibly buggy string
manipulation inside kernel is far more desirable than an already used
API that is designed specifically for this purpose. Also not expecting
this sysctl to be changed very often so robustness is preferred over
simplicity if that simplicity is accompanied by buggy behavior.

I'll add similar text in the commit log.

>> Any capabilities that are not part of this mask will be controlled and
>> will not be allowed to processes in controlled user-ns.
>>
>> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
>> ---
>> v3:
>> Added couple of comments as requested by Serge Hallyn
>> v2:
>> Rebase
>> v1:
>> Initial submission
>>
>> Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 21 ++++++++++++++++++
>> include/linux/capability.h | 3 +++
>> kernel/capability.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> kernel/sysctl.c | 5 +++++
>> 4 files changed, 76 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
>> index 694968c7523c..a1d39dbae847 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
>> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
>> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
>> - bootloader_version [ X86 only ]
>> - callhome [ S390 only ]
>> - cap_last_cap
>> +- controlled_userns_caps_whitelist
>> - core_pattern
>> - core_pipe_limit
>> - core_uses_pid
>> @@ -187,6 +188,26 @@ CAP_LAST_CAP from the kernel.
>>
>> ==============================================================
>>
>> +controlled_userns_caps_whitelist
>> +
>> +Capability mask that is whitelisted for "controlled" user namespaces.
>
> How is a user-ns marked as "controlled"? Please clarify this.
>
Hmm, it's mentioned in this same paragraph (at the end). Looks like you miss it!

>> +Any capability that is missing from this mask will not be allowed to
>> +any process that is attached to a controlled-userns. e.g. if CAP_NET_RAW
>> +is not part of this mask, then processes running inside any controlled
>> +userns's will not be allowed to perform action that needs CAP_NET_RAW
>> +capability. However, processes that are attached to a parent user-ns
>> +hierarchy that is *not* controlled and has CAP_NET_RAW can continue
>> +performing those actions. User-namespaces are marked "controlled" at
>> +the time of their creation based on the capabilities of the creator.
>> +A process that does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN will create user-namespaces
>> +that are controlled.
>> +
>> +The value is expressed as two comma separated hex words (u32). This
>> +sysctl is avaialble in init-ns and users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init-ns
>> +are allowed to make changes.
>
> Could you add here a shell session that demonstrates the use of these
> interfaces and how they allow/disallow capabilities.
>
OK, will add something to address this.

> Is there a way that a process can see whether it is a controlled user-ns
> vs an uncontrolled user-ns? I think it would be good to explain in this
> doc patch.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Michael
>
>> +==============================================================
>> +
>> core_pattern:
>>
>> core_pattern is used to specify a core dumpfile pattern name.
>> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
>> index f640dcbc880c..7d79a4689625 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
>> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
>> #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
>>
>> #include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
>> +#include <linux/sysctl.h>
>>
>>
>> #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
>> @@ -248,6 +249,8 @@ extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
>>
>> /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
>> extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
>> +int proc_douserns_caps_whitelist(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
>> + void __user *buff, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
>>
>> extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size);
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
>> index 1e1c0236f55b..4a859b7d4902 100644
>> --- a/kernel/capability.c
>> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
>> @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
>>
>> int file_caps_enabled = 1;
>>
>> +kernel_cap_t controlled_userns_caps_whitelist = CAP_FULL_SET;
>> +
>> static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
>> {
>> file_caps_enabled = 0;
>> @@ -507,3 +509,48 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns)
>> rcu_read_unlock();
>> return (ret == 0);
>> }
>> +
>> +/* Controlled-userns capabilities routines */
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
>> +int proc_douserns_caps_whitelist(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
>> + void __user *buff, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
>> +{
>> + DECLARE_BITMAP(caps_bitmap, CAP_LAST_CAP);
>> + struct ctl_table caps_table;
>> + char tbuf[NAME_MAX];
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + ret = bitmap_from_u32array(caps_bitmap, CAP_LAST_CAP,
>> + controlled_userns_caps_whitelist.cap,
>> + _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S);
>> + if (ret != CAP_LAST_CAP)
>> + return -1;
>> +
>> + scnprintf(tbuf, NAME_MAX, "%*pb", CAP_LAST_CAP, caps_bitmap);
>> +
>> + caps_table.data = tbuf;
>> + caps_table.maxlen = NAME_MAX;
>> + caps_table.mode = table->mode;
>> + ret = proc_dostring(&caps_table, write, buff, lenp, ppos);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> + if (write) {
>> + kernel_cap_t tmp;
>> +
>> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> + return -EPERM;
>> +
>> + ret = bitmap_parse_user(buff, *lenp, caps_bitmap, CAP_LAST_CAP);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + ret = bitmap_to_u32array(tmp.cap, _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S,
>> + caps_bitmap, CAP_LAST_CAP);
>> + if (ret != CAP_LAST_CAP)
>> + return -1;
>> +
>> + controlled_userns_caps_whitelist = tmp;
>> + }
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
>> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
>> index 557d46728577..759b6c286806 100644
>> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
>> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
>> @@ -1217,6 +1217,11 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
>> .extra2 = &one,
>> },
>> #endif
>> + {
>> + .procname = "controlled_userns_caps_whitelist",
>> + .mode = 0644,
>> + .proc_handler = proc_douserns_caps_whitelist,
>> + },
>> { }
>> };
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Michael Kerrisk
> Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
> Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/

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