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Subject[PATCH v3 1/2] arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2
Date
Use PSCI based mitigation for speculative execution attacks targeting
the branch predictor. We use the same mechanism as the one used for
Cortex-A CPUs, we expect the PSCI version call to have a side effect
of clearing the BTBs.

Signed-off-by: Jayachandran C <jnair@caviumnetworks.com>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index 70e5f18..45ff9a2 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -338,6 +338,16 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1),
},
+ {
+ .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN),
+ .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+ },
+ {
+ .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2),
+ .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+ },
#endif
{
}
--
2.7.4
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