Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | Eric Biggers <> | Subject | [PATCH v2 6/6] KEYS: remove KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE | Date | Tue, 26 Sep 2017 13:11:05 -0700 |
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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Now that a key's reject_error is stored in the flags word, we can check for nonzero reject_error rather than for KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE. Do this, then remove KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> --- include/linux/key.h | 20 ++++++++++++-------- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 2 +- security/keys/gc.c | 4 +--- security/keys/key.c | 4 +--- security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 +- security/keys/keyring.c | 2 +- security/keys/proc.c | 2 +- security/keys/request_key.c | 2 +- security/keys/trusted.c | 2 +- security/keys/user_defined.c | 2 +- 10 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index fcb79eedbdb5..ecae4c1e4375 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -181,13 +181,12 @@ struct key { #define KEY_FLAG_REVOKED 2 /* set if key had been revoked */ #define KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA 3 /* set if key consumes quota */ #define KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT 4 /* set if key is being constructed in userspace */ -#define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE 5 /* set if key is negative */ -#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR 6 /* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */ -#define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED 7 /* set if key has been invalidated */ -#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 8 /* set if key is built in to the kernel */ -#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 9 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */ -#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 10 /* set if key should not be removed */ -#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING 11 /* set if key is a user or user session keyring */ +#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR 5 /* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */ +#define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED 6 /* set if key has been invalidated */ +#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 7 /* set if key is built in to the kernel */ +#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 8 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */ +#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 9 /* set if key should not be removed */ +#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING 10 /* set if key is a user or user session keyring */ /* * If the key is negatively instantiated, then bits 20-31 hold the error @@ -376,7 +375,12 @@ static inline bool key_is_instantiated(const struct key *key) unsigned long flags = smp_load_acquire(&key->flags); return (flags & KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED) && - !(flags & KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE); + !(flags & KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK); +} + +static inline bool key_is_negative(const struct key *key) +{ + return key->flags & KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK; } #define dereference_key_rcu(KEY) \ diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 69855ba0d3b3..f54b92868bc3 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret = 0; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_negative(key)) return -ENOKEY; if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c index 87cb260e4890..0adc52be3ea9 100644 --- a/security/keys/gc.c +++ b/security/keys/gc.c @@ -135,9 +135,7 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys) key_check(key); /* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */ - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) && - !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags) && - key->type->destroy) + if (key_is_instantiated(key) && key->type->destroy) key->type->destroy(key); security_key_free(key); diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 3ffb6829972f..990573a14666 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -407,10 +407,8 @@ static void mark_key_instantiated(struct key *key, unsigned int reject_error) do { old = READ_ONCE(key->flags); - new = (old & ~(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE | - KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK)) | + new = (old & ~KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK) | KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED | - (reject_error ? KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE : 0) | (reject_error << KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT); } while (cmpxchg_release(&key->flags, old, new) != old); } diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 19a09e121089..e90b352cc3bd 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) { + if (key_is_negative(key)) { ret = -ENOKEY; goto error2; } diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 1dfff0eac474..16d21d0e5e45 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) { /* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ - if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) { + if (kflags & KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK) { ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-(int)(kflags >> KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT)); kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret); diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index a038069ac46a..7d34e70f8aa1 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) showflag(flags, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD), showflag(flags, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA), showflag(flags, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT), - showflag(flags, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE), + (flags & KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK) ? 'N' : '-', showflag(flags, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED), refcount_read(&key->usage), xbuf, diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 0aab68344837..1953ceb33efc 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr) /* Pairs with RELEASE in mark_key_instantiated() */ flags = smp_load_acquire(&key->flags); - if (flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) + if (flags & KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK) return -(int)(flags >> KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT); return key_validate(key); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index ddfaebf60fc8..bd85315cbfeb 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) char *datablob; int ret = 0; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_negative(key)) return -ENOKEY; p = key->payload.data[0]; if (!p->migratable) diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 3d8c68eba516..a5506400836c 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* attach the new data, displacing the old */ key->expiry = prep->expiry; - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (!key_is_negative(key)) zap = dereference_key_locked(key); rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]); prep->payload.data[0] = NULL; -- 2.14.1.992.g2c7b836f3a-goog
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