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SubjectRe: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
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On 7/11/2017 10:38 AM, Brian Gerst wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 11:02 AM, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>> On 7/10/2017 11:58 PM, Brian Gerst wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 3:50 PM, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 7/8/2017 7:57 AM, Brian Gerst wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Currently there is a check if the address being mapped is in the ISA
>>>>>> range (is_ISA_range()), and if it is, then phys_to_virt() is used to
>>>>>> perform the mapping. When SME is active, the default is to add
>>>>>> pagetable
>>>>>> mappings with the encryption bit set unless specifically overridden.
>>>>>> The
>>>>>> resulting pagetable mapping from phys_to_virt() will result in a
>>>>>> mapping
>>>>>> that has the encryption bit set. With SME, the use of ioremap() is
>>>>>> intended to generate pagetable mappings that do not have the encryption
>>>>>> bit set through the use of the PAGE_KERNEL_IO protection value.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Rather than special case the SME scenario, remove the ISA range check
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> usage of phys_to_virt() and have ISA range mappings continue through
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> remaining ioremap() path.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 7 +------
>>>>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>>>>>> index 4c1b5fd..bfc3e2d 100644
>>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>>>>>> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
>>>>>> #include <linux/slab.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
>>>>>> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
>>>>>> #include <asm/e820/api.h>
>>>>>> @@ -106,12 +107,6 @@ static void __iomem
>>>>>> *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>>>>>> }
>>>>>>
>>>>>> /*
>>>>>> - * Don't remap the low PCI/ISA area, it's always mapped..
>>>>>> - */
>>>>>> - if (is_ISA_range(phys_addr, last_addr))
>>>>>> - return (__force void __iomem *)phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
>>>>>> -
>>>>>> - /*
>>>>>> * Don't allow anybody to remap normal RAM that we're using..
>>>>>> */
>>>>>> pfn = phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Removing this also affects 32-bit, which is more likely to access
>>>>> legacy devices in this range. Put in a check for SME instead
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I originally had a check for SME here in a previous version of the
>>>> patch. Thomas Gleixner recommended removing the check so that the code
>>>> path was always exercised regardless of the state of SME in order to
>>>> better detect issues:
>>>>
>>>> http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=149803067811436&w=2
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Tom
>>>
>>>
>>> Looking a bit closer, this shortcut doesn't set the caching
>>> attributes. So it's probably best to get rid of it anyways. Also
>>> note, there is a corresponding check in iounmap().
>>
>>
>> Good catch. I'll update the patch to include the removal of the ISA
>> checks in the iounmap() path as well.
>
> I now think it should be kept but also emit a warning, at least for
> the short term. There is bad code out there (vga16fb for example)
> that calls iounmap() blindly without calling ioremap() first. We
> don't want to actually follow through with the unmap on the linear
> mapping.

Yup, was just about to reply to the other email on this. That makes
sense, keep the check but add a warning to it so that it will catch
any misuses of iounmap() and those can then be addressed.

Thanks,
Tom

>
> --
> Brian Gerst
>

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