Messages in this thread | | | From | "Jason A. Donenfeld" <> | Date | Sun, 18 Jun 2017 21:11:20 +0200 | Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness |
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On Sun, Jun 18, 2017 at 5:46 PM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote: > You are effectively proposing that there ought to be a middle range of > security between prandom_32, get_random_u32/get_random_u64 and > get_random_bytes(). I think that's going to lead to all sorts of > complexity and bugs from people not understanding when they should use > get_random_u32 vs get_random_bytes versus prandom_u32. And then we'll > end up needing to audit all of the callsites for get_random_u32() so > they don't violate this new usage rule that you are proposing.
I agree with you wholeheartedly.
get_random_* provides the secure random numbers. prandom_* provides the insecure random numbers.
Introducing some kind of middle ground will result in needless complexity and inevitable bugs.
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